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Abstract
The fact that “natural” theories, i.e. theories which have something like an
“idea” to them, are almost always linearly ordered with regard to logical
strength has been called one of the great mysteries of the foundation of
mathematics. However, one easily establishes the existence of theories with
incomparable logical strengths using self-reference (Rosser-style). As a result,
PA + Con(PA) is not the least theory whose strength is greater than that
of PA. But still we can ask: is there a sense in which PA + Con(PA) is
the least “natural” theory whose strength is greater than that of PA? In
this paper we exhibit natural theories in strength strictly between PA and
PA + Con(PA) by introducing a notion of slow consistency.
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1. Preliminaries
PA is Peano Arithmetic. PA k denotes the subtheory of PA usually
denoted by IΣk. It consists of a finite base theory P
− (which are the axioms
for a commutative discretely ordered semiring) together with a single Πk+2
axiom which asserts that induction holds for Σk formulae. For functions
F : N→ N we use exponential notation F 0(x) = x and F k+1(x) = F (F k(x))
to denote repeated compositions of F .
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In what follows we require an ordinal representation system for ε0. More-
over, we assume that these ordinals come equipped with specific fundamental
sequences λ[n] for each limit ordinal λ ≤ ε0. Their definition springs forth
from their representation in Cantor normal form (to base ω). For an ordinal
α such that α > 0, α has a unique representation :
α = ωα1 · n1 + · · ·+ ωαk · nk,
where 0 < k, n1, . . . , nk < ω, and α1, . . . , αk are ordinals such that α1 > · · · >
αk.
If the Cantor normal form of β > 0 is ωβ1 ·m1 + · · · + ωβl ·ml, we write
α β if α > β and αk ≥ β1.
Definition 1.1. For α an ordinal and n a natural number, let ωαn be defined
inductively by ωα0 := α, and ω
α
n+1 := ω
ωαn .
We also write ωn for ω
1
n. In particular, ω0 = 1 and ω1 = ω.
Definition 1.2. For each limit ordinal λ ≤ ε0, define a strictly monotone
sequence, λ[n], of ordinals converging to λ from below. We use the fact,
following from the Cantor normal form representation, that if 0 < α < ε0,
then there are unique β, γ < ε0, and 0 < m < ω such that
α = β + ωγ ·m
and either β = 0 or β has normal form ωβ1 ·m1 + · · ·+ ωβl ·ml with βl > γ.
The definition of λ[n] proceeds by recursion on this representation of λ.
Case 1. λ = β + ωγ ·m and γ = δ + 1.
Put λ[n] = β+ωγ ·(m−1)+ωδ ·(n+1). (Remark: In particular, ω[n] = n+1.)
Case 2. λ = β + ωγ ·m, and γ < λ is a limit ordinal.
Put λ[n] = β + ωγ · (m− 1) + ωγ[n].
Case 3. λ = ε0.
Put ε0[0] = ω and ε0[n+ 1] = ω
ε0[n]. (Remark: Thus ε0[n] = ωn+1.)
It will be convenient to have α[n] defined for non-limit α. We set (β+1)[n] =
β and 0[n] = 0.
Definition 1.3. By “a fast growing ” hierarchy we simply mean a trans-
finitely extended version of the Grzegorczyk hierarchy i.e. a transfinite se-
quence sequence of number-theoretic functions Fα : N → N defined recur-
sively by iteration at successor levels and diagonalization over fundamental
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sequences at limit levels. We use the following hierarchy:
F0(n) = n+ 1
Fα+1(n) = F
n+1
α (n)
Fα(n) = Fα[n](n) if α is a limit.
It is closely related to the Hardy hierarchy:
H0(n) = n
Hα+1(n) = Hα(n+ 1)
Hα(n) = Hα[n](n) if α is a limit.
Their relationship is as follows:
Hωα = Fα (1)
for every α < ε0. If α = ω
α1 · n1 + · · · + ωαk · nk is in Cantor normal form
and β < ωαk+1, then
Hα+β = Hα ◦Hβ. (2)
Ketonen and Solovay [8] found an interesting combinatorial characteriza-
tion of the Hα’s. Call an interval [k, n] 0-large if k ≤ n, α + 1-large if there
are m,m′ ∈ [k, n] such that m 6= m′ and [m,n] and [m′, n] are both α-large;
and λ-large (where λ is a limit) if [k, n] is λ[k]-large.
Theorem 1.4 (Ketonen, Solovay [8]). Let α < ε0.
Hα(n) = least m such that [n,m] is α-large
Fα(n) = least m such that [n,m] is ω
α-large.
The order of growth of Fε0 is essentially the same as that of the Paris-
Harrington function f
PH
. More details will be provided in section 3.1.
2. Capturing the Fα’s in PA
In [8] many facts about the functions Fα, as befits their definition, are
proved by transfinite induction on the ordinals ≤ ε0. In [8] there is no
attempt to determine whether they are provable in PA (let alone in weaker
theories). In what follows we will have to assume that some of the properties
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of the Fα’s hold in all models of PA. As a consequence, we will revisit some
parts of [8], especially section 2, and recast them in such a way that they
become provable in PA. Statements shown by transfinite induction on the
ordinals in [8] will be proved by ordinary induction on the term complexity
of ordinal representations, adding extra assumptions.
Definition 2.1. The computation of Fα(x) is closely connected with the
step-down relations of [8] and [19]. For α < β ≤ ε0 we write β −→
n
α if
for some sequence of ordinals γ0, . . . , γr we have γ0 = β, γi+1 = γi[n], for
0 ≤ i < r, and γr = α. If we also want to record the number of steps r, we
shall write α r−→
n
β.
The definition of the functions Fα for α ≤ ε0 employs transfinite recursion
on α. It is therefore not immediately clear how we can speak about these
functions in arithmetic. Later on we shall need to refer to a definition of
Fα(x) = y in an arbitrary model of PA. As it turns out, this can be done
via a formula of low complexity.
Lemma 2.2. There is a ∆0-formula expressing Fα(x) = y (as a predicate of
α, x, y).
Proof : This is shown in [23, 5.2]. The main idea is that the computation
of Fα(x) can be described as a rewrite systems, that is, as a sequence of
manipulations of expressions of the form
F n1α1 (F
n2
α2
(. . . (F nkαk (n)) . . .)),
where n1, . . . , nk ∈ ω − {0} and α1 > . . . > αk ≥ 0. uunionsq
Let I∆0 be the subsystem of Peano Arithmetic in which induction applies
only to formulas with bounded quantifiers (∆0-formulas). If we add to I∆0
the axiom exp = ∀x > 1∀y ∃z E0(x, y, z), saying that the exponential func-
tion is total, then the resulting theory will be denoted by I∆0(exp). I∆0(exp)
is strong enough to prove all of the results of elementary number theory. For
example, Matijasevic’s Theorem is provable in it.
Lemma 2.3. We use Fα(x) ↓ to denote ∃y Fα(x) = y. Fα ↓ stands for
∀xFα(x) ↓.
The following are provable in I∆0(exp):
(i) If β −→
x
α and Fβ(x) ↓, then Fα(x) ↓ and Fβ(x) ≥ Fα(x).
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(ii) If Fβ(x) ↓ and x > y, then Fβ(y) ↓ and Fβ(x) ≥ Fβ(y).
(iii) If α > β and Fα ↓, then Fβ ↓.
(iv) If i > 0 and F iα(x) ↓ then x < F iα(x).
Proof : (i) follows by induction on the length r of the sequence γ0, . . . , γr
with γ0 = β, γi+1 = γi[n], for 0 ≤ i < r, and γr = α. In the proof one uses
the fact that ‘Fδ(x) = y’ is ∆0 as a relation with arguments δ, x, y, and also
uses [23, Theorem 5.3] (or rather Claim 1 in Appendix A of [22]).
(ii) follows from [23, Proposition 5.4(v)]. (iii) follows from [23, Proposi-
tion 5.4(iv)]. (iv) is [23, Proposition 5.4(i)]. uunionsq
There is an additional piece of information that is provided by the par-
ticular coding and ∆0 formula denoting Fα(x) = y used in [23, 5.2], namely
that there is a fixed polynomial P in one variable such that for all α ≤ ε0, the
number of steps it takes to compute Fα(x) is always bounded by P (Fα(x)).
This has a useful consequence that we are going to exploit in the next lemma.
Lemma 2.4. The following is provable in I∆0(exp): Let α ≤ ε0. Suppose
Fα(n) ↓. Then α r−→
n
0 for some r ≤ P (Fα(n)).
Proof : We clearly have that the number of steps it takes to compute
Fα(n) is a bound for any sequence of ordinals γ0, . . . , γs with γ0 = α, γs > 0,
and γi+1 = γi[n] for 0 ≤ i < s. Hence s < P (Fα(n)) and thus α r−→
n
0 for
some r ≤ P (Fα(n)). uunionsq
Convention. For the remainder of this section we will be working in
the background theory PA, thus all statements are formally provable in PA.
A cursory glance would reveal that the fragment IΣ1 is certainly capacious
enough, and very likely I∆0(exp) would suffice, too.
Lemma 2.5. (i) Let α −→
n
β, α −→
n
γ, β > γ. Then β −→
n
γ.
(ii) Let α −→
n
β, β −→
n
γ. Then α −→
n
γ.
Proof : This is evident from the definition. uunionsq
Definition 2.6. Let α, β be ordinals. Say that α meshes with β, if for some
ordinals γ, δ, we have α = ωγ · δ and β < ωγ+1.
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Note that if α and β have Cantor normal forms α = ωα1 ·n1+. . .+ωαk ·nk,
β = ωβ1 ·m1 + . . .+ ωβl ·ml, respectively, then the condition that α meshes
with β is precisely that αk ≥ β1.
Lemma 2.7. Let α, β < ε0. Let α mesh with β > 0. Then (α + β)[n] =
α + β[n]. Thus if β −→
n
γ, then α + β −→
n
α + γ.
Proof : That α meshes with β implies that the Cantor normal form of
α + β is basically the concatenation of those for α, β. The first claim thus
follows from the way that the definition of δ[n] focuses on the rightmost term
of the Cantor normal form of δ, provided δ < ε0. The second claim reduces
to the special case when γ = β[n], using the transitivity of −→
n
. This special
claim is evident by the first claim. uunionsq
Lemma 2.8. Let k < l < ω, α < ε0, and suppose that ω
α · l −→
n
0. Then
ωα · l −→
n
ωα · k.
Proof : This holds by assumption if k = 0. So suppose that n > 0. Let
ωα · k < δ ≤ ωα · l. Then δ can be uniquely written as δ = ωα · k + γ for
some γ > 0, and ωα · k and γ mesh. Thus it follows from Lemma 2.7 that
δ[n] = ωα · k + γ[n] and hence δ[n] ≥ ωα · k. Since ωα · l −→
n
0, we conclude
that ωα · l −→
n
ωα · k. uunionsq
Lemma 2.9. Let n ≥ 1. Let δ < ε0. Suppose ωδ+1 −→
n
0. Then ωδ+1 −→
n
ωδ.
Proof : ωδ+1 −→
n
ωδ+1[n] = ωδ ·(n+1). Now apply Lemma 2.8 and Lemma
2.5(ii). uunionsq
Lemma 2.10. Let α1 < ε0. Let n ≥ 1. Suppose α1 −→
n
α2 and ω
α1 −→
n
0.
Then ωα1 −→
n
ωα2.
Proof : Let α1
x−→
n
α2. By induction on x we show that ω
α1 −→
n
ωα2 .
If x = 0 this is trivial. Suppose x > 0. If α1 is a successor α0 + 1,
then α1[n] = α0
x−1−−→
n
α2 and thus α
α0 −→
n
ωα2 by the induction hypothesis.
Also ωα1 [n] = ωα0 · (n + 1) and ωα0 · (n + 1) −→
n
ωα0 owing to Lemma 2.8.
Consequently, ωα1 −→
n
ωα2 .
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Now let α1 be a limit. Then ω
α1 [n] = ωα1[n]. Inductively, as α1[n]
x−1−−→
n
α2,
we have that ωα1[n] −→
n
ωα2 . Hence ωα1 −→
n
ωα2 . uunionsq
Lemma 2.11. Let α < ε0. Suppose ω
α x−→
n
0. Then α
y−→
n
0 for some y < x.
Proof : We proceed by induction on x. If α = 0 then this is obvious.
Let α = α0 + 1. Then ω
α[n] = ωα0 · n + ωα0 x−1−−→
n
0. In light of Lemma
2.7 we conclude that ωα0 u−→
n
0 for some u ≤ x − 1. Thus, by the inductive
assumption, α0
v−→
n
0 for some v < x− 1. Therefore α v+1−−→
n
0 with v + 1 < x.
Now let α be a limit. Then ωα[n] = ωα[n]
x−1−−→
n
0. Inductively we thus
have α[n] u−→
n
0 for some u < x− 1, and hence α u+1−−→
n
0 where u+ 1 < x. uunionsq
Proposition 2.12. Let λ be a limit ≤ ε0. Suppose i < j < ω and λ[j] −→
n
0.
Then λ[j] −→
n
λ[i].
Proof : We proceed by induction on the (term) complexity of λ.
Case 1. λ = β + ωα+1 ·m. Then λ[k] = β + ωα+1 · (m− 1) + ωα · (k + 1).
As λ[j] −→
n
0 entails that ωα · (j + 1) −→
n
0, it follows from Lemma 2.8 that
ωα · (j + 1) −→
n
ωα · (i+ 1). But then, by Lemma 2.7,
λ[j] = β+ωα+1 ·(m−1)+ωα ·(j+1) −→
n
β+ωα+1 ·(m−1)+ωα ·(i+1) = λ[i].
Case 2. λ = β + ωγ ·m, and γ is a limit ordinal. Then λ[k] = β + ωγ ·
(m − 1) + ωγ[k]. λ[j] −→
n
0 implies that ωγ[j] −→
n
0, and hence, by Lemma
2.11, γ[j] −→
n
0. Since the term complexity of γ is smaller than that of λ the
inductive assumption yields γ[j] −→
n
γ[i], and hence ωγ[j] −→
n
ωγ[i] by Lemma
2.10. As a result, by Lemma 2.7,
λ[j] = β + ωγ · (m− 1) + ωγ[j] −→
n
β + ωγ · (m− 1) + ωγ[i] = λ[i].
Case 3. λ = ε0. Then λ[j] = ωj+1 = ω
ωj . From the assumption λ[j] −→
n
0,
applying Lemma 2.11 iteratively, one deduces that ωk −→
n
0 holds for all k ≤
j + 1. Obviously, ω −→
n
1. Thus, by Lemma 2.10, ω2 = ω
ω −→
n
ω1 = ω = ω1.
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Iterating this procedure we have ωl+1 −→
n
ωl for all l ≤ j. By transitivity of
−→
n
we thus arrive at λ[j] = ωj+1 −→
n
ωi+1 = λ[j]. uunionsq
Lemma 2.13. Let n, k < ω and n > 0. Suppose ωk+1 −→
n
0. Then ωk+1 −→
n
ωk + 1.
Proof : From the proof of Proposition 2.12, Case 3, we infer that ωu+1 −→
n
0 for all u ≤ k. Now use induction on u ≤ k to show that ωu+1 −→
n
ωu + 1.
If u = 0 then ωu = 1 and ωu+1 = ω, and ω −→
n
2 holds since n ≥ 1. Now
suppose u = v + 1 and ωv+1 −→
n
ωv + 1. Then, as ωu+1 −→
n
0, we have
ωu+1 = ω
ωv+1 −→
n
ωωv+1 (3)
by applying Lemma 2.10. In particular, ωωv+1 −→
n
0, and therefore
ωωv+1[n] = ωωv · (n+ 1) = ωv+1 · (n+ 1) −→
n
ωv+1 + ωv+1 (4)
since n > 0. Since we also have ωv+1 −→
n
ω0 = 1 by Proposition 2.12, (4)
implies
ωωv+1 −→
n
ωv+1 + 1. (5)
Combining (3) and (5) yields ωu+1 −→
n
ωu + 1. uunionsq
Corollary 2.14. Let k, n < ω and n > 0.
(i) Suppose ε0[k + 1] −→
n
0. Then ε0[k + 1] −→
n
ε0[k] + 1.
(ii) Suppose Fε0[k+1](n) ↓. Then Fε0[k+1](n) ≥ Fε0[k](Fε0[k](n)).
Proof : As ε0[u] = ωu+1, (i) is a consequence of Lemma 2.13.
(ii): By Lemma 2.4, Fε0[k+1](n) ↓ implies that ε0[k+ 1] −→n 0. Thus, using (i),
we have ε0[k + 1] −→
n
ε0[k] + 1. Hence, by Lemma 2.3(i),
Fε0[k+1](n) ≥ Fε0[k]+1(n) = F n+1ε0[k](n) ≥ Fε0[k](Fε0[k](n)),
where the last inequality is a consequence of Lemma 2.3(iv). uunionsq
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3. Slow consistency
To motivate our notion of slow consistency we recall the concept of in-
terpretability of one theory in another theory. Let S and S ′ be arbitrary
theories. S ′ is interpretable in S or S interprets S ′ (in symbols S ′ E S)
“if roughly speaking, the primitive concepts and the range of the variables
of S ′ are defined in such a way as to turn every theorem of S ′ into a theorem
of S” (quoted from [12] p. 96; for details see [12, section 6]).
To simplify matters, we restrict attention to theories T formulated in
the language of PA which contain the axioms of PA and have a primitive
recursive axiomatization, i.e. being an axiom of T is primitive recursively
decidable.
For an integer k ≥ 0, we denote by T k the theory consisting of the first
k (non-logical) axioms of T . Let Con(T ) be the arithmetized statement that
T is consistent.
A theory T is reflexive if it proves the consistency of all its finite sub-
theories, i.e. T ` Con(T k) for all k ∈ N. Note that theories satisfying the
conditions spelled out above will always be reflexive.
Another interesting relationship between theories we shall consider is
T1 ⊆Π1 T2, i.e. every Π1 theorem of T1 is also a theorem of T2.
Theorem 3.1. Let S, T be theories that satisfy the conditions spelled out
above. Then:
S E T if and only if T ` Con(S n) holds for all n ∈ N (6)
if and only if S ⊆Π1 T. (7)
Proof : (6) seems to be due to Orey [13]. Another easily accessible proof
of (6) can be found in [12, Section 6, Theorem 5]. (7) was first stated in [7]
and [11]. A proof can also be found in [12, Section 6, Theorem 6]. uunionsq
We know that
Con(PA) ↔ ∀xCon(PAx).
Given a function f : N → N (say provably total in PA) we are thus led to
the following consistency statement:
Conf (PA) := ∀xCon(PAf(x)). (8)
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It is perhaps worth pointing out that the exact meaning of Conf (PA) de-
pends on the representation that we choose for f .
Statements of the form (8) are interesting only if the function f grows
extremely slowly, though still has an infinite range but PA cannot prove that
fact.
Definition 3.2. Define
F−1ε0 (n) = max({k ≤ n | ∃y ≤ nFε0(k) = y} ∪ {0}).
Note that, by Lemma 2.2, the graph of F−1ε0 has a ∆0 definition. Thus it
follows that F−1ε0 is a provably recursive function of PA.
Let Con∗(PA) be the statement ∀xCon(PA F−1ε0 (x)). Of course, in the
definition of Con∗(PA) we have in mind some standard representation of Fε0
referred to in Lemma 2.2. Note that Con∗(PA) is equivalent to the statement
∀x [Fε0(x) ↓→ Con(PAx)].
Proposition 3.3. PA 6` Con∗(PA).
Proof : Aiming at a contradiction, suppose PA ` Con∗(PA). Then
PAk` Con∗(PA) for all sufficiently large k. As PAk` Fε0(k) ↓ on account
of Fε0(k) ↓ being a true Σ1 statement, we arrive at PA k` Con(PA k),
contradicting Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem. uunionsq
Proposition 3.3 holds in more generality.
Corollary 3.4. If T is a recursive consistent extension of PA and f is a
total recursive function with unbounded range, then
T 6` ∀xCon(T f(x))
where f(x) ↓ is understood to be formalized via some Σ1 representation of f .
Proof : Basically the same proof as for Proposition 3.3. uunionsq
It is quite natural to consider another version of slow consistency where
the function f : N → N, rather than acting as a bound on the fragments of
PA, restricts the lengths of proofs. Let ⊥ be a Go¨del number of the canon-
ical inconsistency and let ProofPA(y, z) be the primitive recursive predicate
expressing the concept that “ y is the Go¨del number of a proof in PA of a
formula with Go¨del number z ”.
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Con`f (PA) := ∀x∀y < f(x)¬ProofPA(y,⊥) (9)
Let Con#(PA) be the statement Con`
F−1ε0
(PA).
Note that Con#(PA) is equivalent to the following formula:
∀u [Fε0(u)↓ → ∀y < u¬ProofPA(y,⊥)].
As it turns out, by contrast with Con∗(PA), Con#(PA) is not very interest-
ing.
Lemma 3.5. PA ` Con#(PA).
Proof : First recall that Gentzen showed how to effectively transform
an alleged PA-proof of an inconsistency (the empty sequent) in his sequent
calculus into another proof of the empty sequent such that the latter gets
assigned a smaller ordinal than the former. More precisely, there is a re-
duction procedure R on proofs P of the empty sequent together with an
assignment ord of representations for ordinals < ε0 to proofs such that
ord(R(P )) < ord(P ). Here < denotes the ordering on ordinal represen-
tations induced by the ordering of the pertaining ordinals. The functions R
and ord and the relation < are primitive recursive (when viewed as acting
on codes for the syntactic objects). With g(n) = ord(Rn(P )), the n-fold
iteration of R applied to P , one has g(0) > g(1) > g(2) > . . . > g(n) for all
n, which is absurd as the ordinals are well-founded.
We will now argue in PA. Suppose that Fε0(u) ↓. Aiming at a contra-
diction assume that there is a p < u such that ProofPA(p,⊥). We have not
said anything about the particular proof predicate ProofPA we use, however,
whatever proof system is assumed, p will be larger than the Go¨del numbers
of all formulae occurring in the proof. The proof that p codes, can be prim-
itive recursively transformed into a sequent calculus proof P of the empty
sequent in such a way that ord(P ) < ωp since p is larger than the number
of logical symbols occurring in any cut or induction formulae featuring in P
(for details see [24, Ch.2]). Inspection of Gentzen’s proof, as e.g. presented
in [24, 2.12.8], shows there is a primitive recursive function ` such that the
number of steps it takes to get from ord(P ) to 0 by applying the reduction
procedure R is majorized by `(Fε0(u)). As a result we have a contradiction
since there is no proof P0 of the empty sequent with ordinal ord(P0) = 0.
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The authors realize that the foregoing proof is merely a sketch. An alter-
native proof can be obtained by harking back to [1]. The proof will be given
in the Appendix. uunionsq
The next goal will be to show that Con(PA) is not derivable in PA +
Con∗(PA). We need some preparatory definitions.
Definition 3.6. Let E denote the “stack of two’s” function, i.e. E(0) = 0
and E(n+ 1) = 2E(n).
Given two elements a and b of a non-standard model M of PA, we say
that ‘ b is much larger than a’ if for every standard integer k we have
Ek(a) < b.
If M is a model of PA and I is a substructure of M we say that I is an
initial segment of M, if for all a ∈ |I| and x ∈ |M|, M |= x < a implies
x ∈ |I|. We will write I < b to mean b ∈ |M| \ |I|. Sometimes we write
a < I to indicate a ∈ |I|.
Theorem 3.7. Let N be a non-standard model of PA (or ∆0(exp)), n be a
standard integer, and e, d ∈ |N| be non-standard such that N |= Fωen(e) = d.
Then there is an initial segment I of N such e < I < d and I is a model of
Πn+1-induction.
Proof : This follows e.g. from [23, Theorem 5.25], letting α = 0, c = e,
a = e and b = d. The technique used to prove Theorem 5.25 in [23] is a
variation of techniques used by Paris in [15]. uunionsq
Corollary 3.8. Let N be a non-standard model of PA, a, e, c ∈ |N| be non-
standard such that N |= Fε0(a) = e and N |= Fε0(a+ 1) = c. Then for every
standard n there is an initial segment I of N such e < I < c and I is a
model of Πn+1-induction.
Proof : We argue in N. From Fε0(a+1) = Fε0[a+1](a+1) = c we conclude
with the help of Corollary 2.14 that
c ≥ Fε0[a](Fε0[a](a+ 1)) ≥ Fε0[a](Fε0[a](a)) = Fε0[a](e) > e.
In view of the previous Theorem we just have to ensure that Fωen(e) = d
for some d with d ≤ c. From Fε0[a](e) ↓ we get ε0[a] −→e 0 by Lemma 2.4.
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Proposition 2.12 guarantees that ε0[p ] −→
e
e holds for all p ≤ a. In particular,
ε0[a− n] −→
e
e. Applying Lemma 2.10 n-times, we arrive at
ε0[a] = ω
ε0[a−n]
n −→e ωen.
In view of Lemma 2.3(i) the latter implies that Fωen(e) ↓ and Fε0[a](e) ≥
Fωen(e). uunionsq
Definition 3.9. Below we shall need the notion of two models M and N of
PA ‘agreeing up to e’. For this to hold, the following conditions must be
met:
1. e belongs to both models.
2. e has the same predecessors in both M and N.
3. If d0, d1, and c are ≤ e (in one of the models M and N), then M |=
d0 + d1 = c iff N |= d0 + d1 = c.
4. If d0, d1, and c are ≤ e (in one of the models M and N), then M |=
d0 · d1 = c iff N |= d0 · d1 = c.
If M and N agree up to e, d ≤ e and θ(x) is a ∆0 formula, it follows that
M |= θ(d) iff N |= θ(d) (cf. [3, Proposition 1]).
Theorem 3.10. PA + Con∗(PA) 6` Con(PA).
Proof : Let M be a countable non-standard model of PA + Fε0 is total.
Let M be the domain of M and a ∈ M be non-standard. Moreover, let
e = FMε0 (a). As a result of the standing assumption, M |= Con(PA a).
Owing to a result of Solovay’s [21, Theorem 1.1] (or similar results in [9]),
there exists a countable model N of PA such that:
(i) M and N agree up to e (in the sense of Definition 3.9).
(ii) N thinks that PAa is consistent.
(iii) N thinks that PAa+1 is inconsistent. In fact there is a proof of 0 = 1
from PAa+1 whose Go¨del number is less than 22
e
(as computed in N).
In actuality, to be able to apply [21, Theorem 1.1] we have to ensure that e
is much larger than a, i.e., Ek(a) < e for every standard number k. It is a
standard fact (provable in PA) that E(x) ≤ F3(x) holds for all sufficiently
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large x (cf. [8, p. 269]). In particular this holds for all non-standard elements
s of M and hence
Ek(s) ≤ F k3 (s) ≤ F s3 (s) ≤ F4(s) < Fε0(s),
so that Ek(a) < e holds for all standard k, leading to e being much larger
than a.
We will now distinguish two cases.
Case 1: N |= Fε0(a + 1) ↑. Then also N |= Fε0(d) ↑ for all d > a by
Lemma 2.3(ii). Hence, in light of (ii), N |= Con∗(PA). As (iii) yields N |=
¬Con(PA), we have
N |= PA + Con∗(PA) + ¬Con(PA). (10)
Case 2: N |= Fε0(a+1) ↓. We then also have e = FNε0 (a), for M and N agree
up to e and the formula ‘Fε0(x) = y’ is ∆0 by Lemma 2.2. Let c := F
N
ε0
(a+1).
By Corollary 3.8, for every standard n there is an initial segment I of N such
e < I < c and I is a model of Πn+1-induction. Moreover, it follows from the
properties of N and the fact that 22
e
< I, that
1. I thinks that PAa is consistent.
2. I thinks that PAa+1 is inconsistent.
3. I thinks that Fε0(a+ 1) is not defined.
Consequently, I |= Con∗(PA) + ¬Con(PA) + Πn+1-induction. Since n was
arbitrary, this shows that PA+Con∗(PA)+¬Con(PA) is a consistent theory.
uunionsq
Proposition 3.3 and Theorem 3.10 can be extended to theories T = PA+
ψ where ψ is a true Π1 statement.
Theorem 3.11. Let T = PA + ψ where ψ is a Π1 statement such that
T + ‘Fε0 is total’ is a consistent theory. Let T k to be the theory PA k +ψ
and Con∗(T) := ∀xCon(T F−1ε0 (x)). Then the strength of T + Con
∗(T ) is
strictly between T and T + Con(T), i.e.
(i) T 6` Con∗(T).
(ii) T + Con∗(T) 6` Con(T).
(iii) T + Con(T) ` Con∗(T).
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Proof : For (i) the same proof as in Proposition 3.3 works with PA
replaced by T. (iii) is obvious. For (ii) note that Solovay’s Theorem also
works for T so that the proof of Case 1 of Theorem 3.10 can be copied. To
deal with Case 2, observe that I |= ψ since ψ is Π1, N |= ψ and I is an initial
segment of N. uunionsq
The methods of Theorem 3.10 can also be used to produce two ‘natural’
slow growing functions f and g such that the theories PA + Conf (PA) and
PA + Cong(PA) are mutually non-interpretable in each other.
Definition 3.12. The even and odd parts of Fε0 are defined as follows:
F evenε0 (2n) = Fε0(2n), F
even
ε0
(2n+ 1) = Fε0(2n) + 1 ,
F oddε0 (2n+ 1) = Fε0(2n+ 1), F
odd
ε0
(2n+ 2) = Fε0(2n+ 1) + 1, F
odd
ε0
(0) = 1,
f(n) = max({k ≤ n | ∃y ≤ nF evenε0 (k) = y} ∪ {0})
g(n) = max({k ≤ n | ∃y ≤ nF oddε0 (k) = y} ∪ {0}).
By Lemma 2.2, the graphs of f and g are ∆0 and both functions are provably
recursive functions of PA.
Remark 3.13. In a much more elaborate form, the method of defining vari-
ants of a given computable functions (such as Fε0) in a piecewise manner
has been employed in [10] to obtain results about degree structures of com-
putable functions and in [5] to obtain forcing-like results about provably
recursive functions.
Theorem 3.14. (i) PA + Conf (PA) 6` Cong(PA).
(ii) PA + Cong(PA) 6` Conf (PA).
Proof : (i) The proof is a variant of that of Theorem 3.10. Let M be a
countable non-standard model of PA + Fε0 is total. Let M be the domain
of M and a ∈ M be non-standard such that M thinks that a is odd. Let
e = FMε0 (a). As before, there exists a countable model N of PA such that:
(i) M and N agree up to e.
(ii) N thinks that PAa is consistent.
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(iii) N thinks that PAa+1 is inconsistent. In fact there is a proof of 0 = 1
from PAa+1 whose Go¨del number is less than 22
e
(as computed in N).
Again we distinguish two cases.
Case 1: N |= Fε0(a+ 1) ↑. Then also N |= Fε0(d) ↑ for all d > a by Lemma
2.3(ii). Since M thinks that a+1 is even, so does N, as both models agree up
to e. Thus N |= F evenε0 (d) ↑ for all d > a. As a result, N |= ∀x f(x) ≤ a, and
hence, N |= Conf (PA). On the other hand, since N |= F oddε0 (a + 1) = e + 1
and N thinks that PAa+1 is inconsistent, it follows that N 6|= Cong(PA).
Case 2: N |= Fε0(a + 1) ↓. As in the proof of Theorem 3.10, letting
c := FNε0 (a+ 1), for each n we find an initial segment I of N such e < I < c
and I is a model of Πn+1-induction. Moreover, it follows from the properties
of N and the fact that 22
e
< I, that
1. I thinks that PAa is consistent.
2. I thinks that PAa+1 is inconsistent.
3. I thinks that Fε0(a+ 1) is not defined.
Consequently as I thinks that a + 1 is even, I |= ∀x f(x) ≤ a, whence
I |= Conf (PA). On the other hand, since I |= F oddε0 (a + 1) = e + 1, we
also have that N 6|= Cong(PA). Since n was arbitrary, this shows that
PA + Conf (PA) + ¬Cong(PA) is a consistent theory.
(ii). The argument is completely analogous, the only difference being that
we start with a non-standard a ∈M such that M thinks that a is even. uunionsq
Corollary 3.15. Neither is PA+Conf (PA) interpretable in PA+Cong(PA)
nor PA + Cong(PA) interpretable in PA + Conf (PA).
Proof : This follows from Theorem 3.14 and Theorem 3.1. uunionsq
3.1. Replacing Fε0 by combinatorial functions
The function Fε0 is defined by reference to ordinal representations. An
“ordinal-free” version of slow consistency with similar properties as Con∗(PA)
can be obtained by utilizing the Paris-Harrington function f
PH
which has
roughly the same order of growth as Fε0 .
Definition 3.16. Let X be a finite set of natural numbers and |X| be the
number of elements in X. X is large if X if X is non-empty, and, letting
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s be the least element of X, X has at least s elements. If d ∈ N then [X]d
denotes the set of all subsets of X of cardinality d. If g : [X]d → Y , a subset
Z of X is homogeneous for g if g is constant on [Z]d. Identify n ∈ N with
the set {0, . . . , n− 1}.
Let a, b, c ∈ N. Then a→ (large)bc if for every map g : [a]b → c, there is a
large homogeneous set for g of cardinality greater than b.
Let σ(b, c) be the least integer a such that a → (large)bc and fPH (n) =
σ(n, n).
Theorem 3.17. (i) (Harrington, Paris [14]) The function f
PH
dominates
all PA-provably recursive functions.
(ii) (Ketonen, Solovay [8]) For n ≥ 20:
Fε0(n− 3) ≤ σ(n, 8) ≤ Fε0(n− 2)
f
PH
(n) ≤ Fε0(n− 1).
Below we shall write T1 / T2 to mean T1 E T2 and T2 5 T1.
Theorem 3.18. Letting G(n) = σ(n+ 3, 8) and g = G−1, i.e.
g(n) = max({k ≤ n | ∃y ≤ nG(k) = y} ∪ {0}),
we have
PA / PA + Cong(PA) E PA + Con∗(PA) / PA + Con(PA).
Proof : The proof of Theorem 3.10 in [8] shows that Fε0(n) ≤ G(n) holds
for n ≥ 5. Moreover, rumination on the proof reveals that one can prove
that if G(n) is defined so is Fε0(n) using the means of PA. Thus PA proves
∀x (G(x) ↓ → Fε0(n) ↓). As a result, PA + Con∗(PA) ` Cong(PA). The
same proof as for Proposition 3.3 shows that PA 6` Cong(PA). uunionsq
3.2. Some remarks
We add some remarks about related strands of investigation.
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3.2.1. Phase transitions
If one defines fα by
fα(n) = max({k ≤ n | ∃y ≤ nFα(k) = y} ∪ {0})
for all α ≤ ε0, then one has PA+Confα(PA) = PA+Con(PA) for all α < ε0
whereas PA + Confε0 (PA) / PA + Con(PA). This result can be construed
as a phase transition. However, one should perhaps bear in mind that this
is a phase transition with respect to a particular hierarchy of functions. It is
possible to define other hierarchies where the transition occurs at a different
ordinal. For instance one could take the inverses of the so-called slow growing
hierarchy (see [6, 2, 25, 26]) which catches up with the fast growing hierarchy
α ≤ ε0 only at the much bigger Bachmann-Howard ordinal.
3.2.2. Statements weaker than Con∗(PA)
The proof-theoretic literature is awash with fast growing functions. Ba-
sically every ordinal analysis of a theory T (see [16, 17, 18]) gives rise to a
hierarchy of fast growing functions (Fα)α≤τ having the following properties:
(i) Every function Fα with α < τ is provably recursive in T . (ii) Every prov-
ably recursive function of T is eventually dominated by some Fα with α < τ .
(iv) Fτ is not provably recursive in T and eventually dominates any provably
recursive function of T . (v) τ is the proof-theoretic ordinal of T .
Now, if one takes a theory T whose ordinal τ is greater than ε0 then with
the statement ConF−1τ (PA) we conjecture that
PA / PA + ConF−1τ (PA) / PA + Con
∗(PA).
Very likely another method for obtaining such intermediate theories will
be provided by the inverses of functions coming from miniaturizations of
Kruskal’s theorem and the graph minor theorem (see [20]).
3.3. A natural Orey sentence
A sentence ϕ of PA is called an Orey sentence if both PA + ϕ E PA
and PA + ¬ϕ E PA hold.
Corollary 3.19. The sentence ∃x (Fε0(x)↑ ∧∀y < xFε0(y)↓ ∧ x is even)
is an Orey sentence.
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Proof : Let ψ be the foregoing sentence. In view of Theorem 3.1, it
suffices to show that PA ` Con(PA k +ψ) and PA ` Con(PA k +¬ψ)
hold for all k. Fix k > 0.
First we show that PA ` Con(PA k +ψ). Note that PA proves the
consistency of PA k +∀xFωk+1(x) ↓ +∃xFε0(x) ↑. Arguing in PA we thus
find a non-standard model N such that
N |= PAk +∀xFωk+1(x) ↓ +∃xFε0(x) ↑ .
In particular there exists a least a ∈ |N| in the sense of N such that
N |= Fε0(a) ↑. If N thinks that a is even, then N |= ψ, which entails
that Con(PAk +ψ). If N thinks that a is odd, we define a cut I such that
I |= PA k and FNε0 (a − 2) < I < FNε0 (a − 1), applying Theorem 3.7. Then
I |= ψ which also entails Con(PAk +ψ).
Next we show that PA ` Con(PA k +¬ψ). As PA proves Con(PA k
+∀xFωk+1(x) ↓), we can argue in PA and assume that we have a model
M |= PA k +∀xFωk+1(x) ↓. If M |= ∀xFε0(x) ↓ then M |= ¬ψ, and
Con(PA k +¬ψ) follows. Otherwise there is a least a in the sense of M
such that FMε0 (a) ↑. If M thinks that a is odd we have M |= ¬ψ, too. If
M thinks that a is even we introduce a cut FMε0 (a − 2) < I′ < FMε0 (a − 1)
such that I′ |= PA k. Since I′ |= Fε0(a − 1) ↑ we have I′ |= ¬ψ, whence
Con(PAk +¬ψ). uunionsq
4. Iterating slow consistency
Recall that we use T1 /T2 to convey that T2 interprets T1 but T1 does not
interpret T2. The slow consistency operator can be iterated and by Theorem
3.1 and Corollary 3.4 we know that we get a proper hierarchy1 in the sense
of /:
PA / PA + Con∗(PA) / PA + Con∗(PA + Con∗(PA))
/ PA + Con∗(PA + Con∗(PA + Con∗(PA))) / . . .
A natural question arising is where this hierarchy resides with respect to
PA + Con(PA).
1We wish to thank the referee for suggesting to look at this hierarchy.
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Theorem 4.1. Let T = PA + ψ where ψ is a Π1 statement. Let T k to be
the theory PAk +ψ and Con∗(T) := ∀xCon(TF−1ε0 (x)). Then:
T + Con(T) ` Con(T + Con∗(T)).
Proof : We will argue in T + Con(T). From Con(T) we infer that there
exists a countable non-standard model M of T. Let M be the domain of M.
Since T is reflexive it follows by overspill that there is a non-standard a ∈M
such that
M |= Con(Ta). (11)
If M |= Fε0(a) ↑, then also M |= Fε0(d) ↑, for all d > a by Lemma 2.3(ii),
and therefore M |= Con∗(T), yielding Con(T + Con∗(T)).
Now assumeM |= Fε0(a) ↓ for the remainder of the proof. IfM |= Fε0(a+
1) ↑, then M will be a model Con∗(T ), too, and hence Con(T + Con∗(T))
holds. So let’s assume M |= Fε0(a+ 1) ↓ as well.
Let e := FMε0 (a) and c := F
M
ε0
(a+1). By Corollary 3.8, for every standard
n there is an initial segment I of M such e < I < c and I is a model of
Πn+1-induction. Moreover, it follows therefore that:
1. I thinks that T a is consistent and that ψ is true, owing to these
statements being true in M and of Π1 form.
2. I thinks that Fε0(a+ 1) is not defined since it is not defined in M.
Consequently, I |= Con∗(T) + Πn+1-induction. Since n was arbitrary, this
shows that T + Con∗(T) is a consistent theory.
The only qualms one might have about the preceding proof is whether
Corollary 3.8 can be formalized in PA. Corollary 3.8 builds on Theorem 3.7,
which is essentially [23, Theorem 5.25]. However, inspection of the proof of
the latter result shows that it can be formalized in PA. uunionsq
Corollary 4.2. Letting T0 := PA and Tn+1 := Tn + Con
∗(Tn), we have
Tm / PA + Con(PA)
for all m.
Proof : Using Theorem 4.1 iteratively (induction on n), we have PA +
Con(PA) ` Con(Tn), and hence Tn + Con(Tn) ⊆ PA + Con(PA). With
Theorem 3.11 we conclude that Tm / PA + Con(PA) holds for all m. uunionsq
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In the above we could have used the hierarchy T′0 := PA and T
′
n+1 :=
PA + Con∗(T′n). Actually, T
′
n and Tn are the same theories, i.e., they prove
the same theorems.
Remark 4.3. All extensions of PA considered in this paper are augmenta-
tions of PA via true Π1 statements. As a result, all of these theories have the
same provably recursive functions. Thus, although the hierarchy of theories
T0 /T1 /T2 / . . . is a proper one, the theories share the same “proof-theoretic
strength” if the latter notion is identified with a theory’s stock of provably
recursive functions.
Remark 4.4. The hierarchy (Tn)n<ω could be extended transfinitely. We
have not investigated this, but conjecture that all the theories Tα with α < ε0
satisfy Tα / PA + Con(PA).
Appendix
We will provide an alternative and more detailed proof of Lemma 3.5,
namely that PA ` Con#(PA).
The reader will be assumed to have access to [1]. That paper uses an
infinitary proof system with the ω-rule (of course). But this system is also
quite peculiar in that the ordinal assignment adhered to is very rigid and,
crucially, it has a so-called accumulation rule. To deal with infinite proofs
in PA, though, one has to use primitive recursive proof trees instead of
arbitrary ones (for details see [4]). The role of the repetition rule (or trivial
rule) (cf. [4]) is of central importance to capturing the usual operations on
proofs, such as inversion and cut elimination, by primitive recursive functions
acting on their codes. In the proof system of [1] the accumulation rule takes
over this role. Now assume that everything in [1] has been recast in terms of
primitive recursive proof trees. Then the cut elimination for infinitary proofs
with finite cut rank (as presented in [4, Theorem 2.19]) can be formalized
in PA. Working in PA, suppose that Fε0(u) ↓. Aiming at a contradiction
assume that there is a p < u such that ProofPA(p,⊥). As above, the proof
that p codes, can be primitive recursively transformed into a proof P of ⊥
in the sequent calculus of [1] with ordinal ωp and cut-degree 0 (in the sense
of [1, Definition 5]). The plan is to reach a contradiction by constructing an
infinite descending sequence of ordinals (αi)i∈N such that α0 = ωp, αi+1 < αi
and αi+1 <li+1 αi for some li+1 < Fωp(2). It remains to determine (αi)i∈N. To
this end we construct a branch of the proof-tree P with `αi ∆i,Γi being the
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i-th node of the branch (bottom-up). The sequent Γi contains only closed
elementary prime formulas and formulas of the form “n ∈ N” whereas ∆i
is of the form {n1 /∈ N, . . . , nr /∈ N} or ∅. We set k∆i := max({2} ∪ {3 ·
n1, . . . , 3 ·nr}) in the former and k∆i := 2 in the latter case. We say that Γi is
true in m if Γi is true when N is interpreted as the finite set {n | 3 · n < m}.
Let Γ0 = {0 = 1} and ∆0 = ∅. Clearly, Γ0 is false in Fα0(2). Now assume
`αi ∆i,Γi has been constructed in such a way that Fαi(k∆i) ↓ and Γi is
false in Fαi(k∆i) and Fαi(k∆i) ≤ Fα0(2). Since Γi is false in Fαi(k∆i) and
Fαi(k∆i) > k∆i , it follows that ∆i,Γi is not an axiom. Thus `αi ∆i,Γi is
not an end-node in P and therefore it is the result of an application of an
inference rule. As the cut-rank of P is 0, the only possible rules are a cut of
rank 0, an N -rule, and Accumulation.
If it is an N -rule, Γi contains “Sn ∈ N” for some n and `β ∆i,Γ′i, n ∈ N
will be a node in P immediately above `αi ∆i,Γi with Γ′i ⊆ Γi and β+1 = αi.
We let αi+1 = β, li+1 = 1, ∆i+1 = ∆i and Γi+1 = Γi, n ∈ N . Since Γi is
false in Fαi(k∆i) and Fαi+1(k∆i) + 3 ≤ Fαi(k∆i) it follows that Γi+1 is false in
Fαi(k∆i+1).
If the last rule is Accumulation, `β ∆i,Γi will be a node in P immediately
above `αi ∆i,Γi for some β <k∆i αi. Then let ∆i+1 = ∆i, Γi+1 = Γi, αi+1 =
β, and li+1 = k∆i . Since Fβ(k∆i) ≤ Fαi(k∆i), Γi+1 is false in Fαi+1(k∆i+1),
too. Inductively we also have Fαi(k∆i) ≤ Fα0(2), and hence li+1 < Fα0(2).
If the last rule is a cut with a closed elementary prime formula A, the
immediate nodes above `αi ∆i,Γi in P are of the form `β ∆i,Γi, A and
`β ∆i,Γi,¬A, respectively, where β + 1 = αi. Let ∆i+1 = ∆i, αi+1 = β, and
li+1 = 1. If A is false let Γi+1 = Γi, A. If A is true, let Γi+1 = Γi,¬A. Clearly,
Γi+1 will be false in Fαi+1(k∆i+1) since this value is smaller than Fαi(k∆i).
Finally suppose the last rule is a cut with cut formula “n ∈ N”. Then
the immediate nodes above `αi ∆i,Γi in P are of the form `β ∆i, n ∈ N,Γi
and `β ∆i, n /∈ N,Γi, respectively, where β + 1 = αi. Set αi+1 = β and and
li+1 = 1. If Fβ(k∆i) ≤ 3 ·n, then “n ∈ N” will be false in Fβ(k∆i), and hence,
as Fβ(k∆i) < Fαi(k∆i), it follows that n ∈ N,Γi will be false in Fβ(k∆i) as
well. So in this case let ∆i+1 = ∆i and Γi+1 = n ∈ N,Γi.
If on the other hand 3 · n < Fβ(k∆i), we compute that
Fβ(k∆i,n/∈N) < Fβ(Fβ(k∆i)) ≤ Fαi(k∆i).
Hence Γi will be false in Fβ(k∆i,n/∈N), and we put ∆i+1 = ∆i, n /∈ N and
Γi+1 = Γi.
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This finishes the definition of the (αi)i∈N. Their construction also guar-
antees that Fαi(li+1) ↓ and Fαi+1(li+1) ≤ Fαi(li+1) ≤ Fωp(2). Note also
that whenever the inference involving `αi+1 ∆i+1,Γi+1 as a premiss and
`αi ∆i,Γi as its conclusion was an application of a rule other than the
Accumulation rule, then we have αi = αi+1 + 1 and li+1 = 1, and hence
Fαi+1(li+1) < Fαi(li+1). As a result, there can only be finitely many of those.
Hence there exists x0 such that for i ≥ x0 the inference from `αi+1 ∆i+1,Γi+1
to `αi ∆i,Γi is always an instance of Accumulation. Furthermore, this en-
tails that ∆i,Γi = ∆j,Γj and li = lj for all i, j > x0. Hence αi+1 <k αi for all
i ≥ x0 where k = lx0+1. However, this is absurd in view of Lemma 2.4 since
then the computation of Fαx0 (k) (i.e. Fαx0 (lx0+1)) would never halt. uunionsq
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